Insurer’s Duty to Defend

An insurer’s duty to defend its insured is broader than its duty to indemnify. Pekin Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 930 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (Ill. 2010); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (Ill. 1992). If the underlying complaint alleges facts within or potentially within policy coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend its insured even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent. Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Swiderski Elecs., Inc., 860 N.E.2d 307, 314-315 (Ill. 2006). An insurer may not justifiably refuse to defend an action against its insured unless it is clear from the face of the underlying complaint that the allegations fail to state facts which bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy’s coverage. Id. However, the insurer must defend if the insurer possesses knowledge of true but unpleaded facts that, when taken together with the allegations in the complaint, indicate that the claim is within or potentially within the policy coverage. Pekin Insurance v. Roszak/ADC, LLC, 931 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Olson Constr., 769 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tillerson, 777 N.E.2d 986, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).

Four Corners Rule

       

Illinois courts generally adhere to the “four corners” or “eight corners” rule. Under this rule, courts compare the four corners of the underlying complaint and the four corners of the insurance policy to determine whether the suit potentially states a covered claim. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 620 N.E.2d 1073 (Ill. 1993); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (Ill. 1992). As noted above, true but unpleaded facts known to the insurer can also trigger an obligation to defend. Swiderski Elecs., 860 N.E.2d at 313; National Union, 769 N.E.2d at 981. Further, and as explained below, Illinois does allow, under certain circumstances, for the consideration of extrinsic evidence. See Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 930 N.E.2d 1011 (Ill. 2010).

Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence

       

Illinois has traditionally considered itself an “eight corners” duty to defend state. However, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly permitted, in some circumstances, the examination of matters beyond the “eight corners” in evaluating duty to defend questions in Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 930 N.E.2d 1011,1020 (Ill. 2010). In Pekin, the court held that its past duty to defend opinions had not intended to “limit the source of an insurer’s duty to defend ‘solely’ to the content of the underlying complaint in all cases.” Id. at 1019. Rather, “a circuit court may, under certain circumstances, look beyond the underlying complaint in order to determine an insurer’s duty to defend.” Id. See American Economy Ins. Co. v. Holabird and Root, 886 N.E.2d 1166, 1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“[C]onsideration of a third-party complaint in determining the duty to defend is in line with the general rule that a trial court may consider evidence beyond the underlying complaint if in doing so the trial court does not determine an issue critical to the underlying action.”); Pekin Ins. Co. v. United Contractors Midwest, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)(third party complaint not considered in duty to defend analysis as pleading was potentially self-serving).

Occurrence Requirement

General rule

An “occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” Viking Constr. Mgmt. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 831 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (citing Lyons v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 811 N.E.2d 718, 722 (Ill App. Ct. 2004). If the policy does not define “accident,” it is defined as “an unforeseen occurrence, usually of an untoward or disastrous character or an undesigned sudden or unexpected event of an inflictive or unfortunate character.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tillerson, 777 N.E.2d 986, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). The natural and ordinary consequences of an act do not constitute an accident. Insurance Corp. of Hanover v. Shelborne Assocs., 905 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Stoneridge Dev. Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 888 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).

In determining whether an occurrence is an accident, Illinois courts examine whether the injury or damage is expected or intended by the insured—not whether the acts were performed intentionally. See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Imperial Marble Corp., 957 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Lyons v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co, 811 N.E.2d 718 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).

Faulty workmanship and construction defect claims

       

The majority rule is that faulty workmanship, standing alone, is generally not covered under CGL policies. Viking Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 831 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). In Illinois, courts have held that the term “accident” does not include the “natural and ordinary consequences of an act.” Pekin Ins. Co. v. Miller, 854 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Viking, 831 N.E. at 15. As the Viking court noted:

Although the policy does not define “accident” it has been defined as “...an unforeseen occurrence, usually of an untoward or disastrous character or an undesigned sudden or unexpected event of an inflictive or unfortunate character.”

Viking, 831 N.E.2d at 6; See also State Farm v. Tillerson, 777 N.E.2d 986 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). Thus, it is not surprising that the Illinois courts have held that a “CGL policy will not cover a general contractor’s suit for breach of contract” and that “there is no ‘occurrence’ when a subcontractor’s defective workmanship necessitates removing and repairing work.” Viking, 831 N.E.2d at 6.

       

In general, a commercial liability policy does not cover an accident of faulty workmanship, but rather, faulty workmanship that causes an accident. Monticello Ins. Co. v. Wil-Freds Constr., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 451, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Accordingly, in the context of construction claims, Illinois courts have held that when a complaint alleges only damages in the nature of repair and replacement of defective construction, the damages are economic losses and do not constitute property damage. Viking, 831 N.E.2d 1. However, accidental damage to property beyond the work itself, which is caused by defective workmanship, has the potential to be covered property damage, and thus an “occurrence.” See Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Larsen, Inc., 956 N.E. 2d 524 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (bringing defective workmanship claim within coverage because complaint alleged damage to common elements and residential units); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Richard Marker Assocs., Inc., 682 N.E.2d 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding examples of covered property damage to include damage to homeowner’s furniture, clothing, and antiques as result of faulty placement of plumbing).

Bodily Injury Requirement

Emotional distress / Consideration of physical manifestations

In duty to defend cases, Illinois courts have held where a policy defines “bodily injury” as “bodily injury”, and not just “injury”, the definitions is restricted to actual physical injury. University of Illinois v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)(restricting term “bodily injury” in insurance policy to “actual physical injury,” as opposed to broadening it to include mental anguish and mental distress.”) See Creamer v. State Farm 514 N.E.2d 214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“bodily injury” defined as “bodily injury to a person”). Therefore, under Illinois law, an action for emotional distress or mental anguish does not allege “bodily injury” for purposes of coverage under a general liability policy unless the emotional distress is accompanied by a physical manifestation of harm. See, e.g., SCR Med. Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Browne, 781 N.E.2d 564, 571 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).

Emotional distress / Consideration of physical manifestations

In SCR Med. Transp. Servs., Inc., supra, the court held that a claim under an automobile insurance policy issued to a medical transportation provider for strong anxiety and fear suffered by a client that was sexually assaulted did not qualify as “bodily injury.” Here, the transportation company’s driver transported the passenger from the hospital to her home. However, the driver sexually assaulted her in the vehicle in an alley, and then later at her home. The court held that the insurer did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the transportation company because the harm did not arise from “bodily injury” caused by an “accident” resulting from the “ownership, maintenance, or use” of a covered auto because the passenger alleged only psychological injuries. The court held that the definition of “bodily injury” is restricted to actual physical injury.

Property Damage Requirement

Purely economic loss

       

It is generally accepted that economic loss alone does not constitute property damage. CMO Graphics, Inc. v. CNA Ins., 450 N.E.2d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (lost profits and goodwill intangibles not covered under property damage provisions of general liability policy); Tobi Eng’g, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 574 N.E.2d 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (insurer for manufacturer of bearing pads used in bridge construction did not have duty to defend against action alleging that insured’s failure to deliver non-defective pads on time caused delay in bridge project as claim did not involve property damage; Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Gust K. Newberg Constr. Co., 578 N.E.2d 1003(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (costs to remedy and repair defective heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system, as well as other resulting damages relating to lost rent, lost productivity from employees, and increased electrical consumption, did not constitute property damage).

       

Economic losses resulting from breach of warranty do not constitute property damage. See Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Chester-Jensen Co., 611 N.E.2d 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tillerson, 777 N.E.2d 986 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). In Stoneridge Dev. Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 888 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), the court held that economic damages caused by breach of the implied warranty of habitability were not property damages because the warranty of habitability is contractual in nature despite its origins in public policy. The Stoneridge court noted that economic damages caused by breach of contract alone are not property damage. On the other hand, the mere fact that a complaint is pled as a breach of contract action is not determinative of whether the complaint alleges property damage caused by an “occurrence.” Travelers Insurance Cos. V. P.C. Quote, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). The court must instead look to the conduct alleged in the language of the complaint to consider potential liability under the insurance policy.

Loss of use

       

Illinois courts have ruled that the loss of use of tangible property is the loss of the ability to use property as an incident to ownership, as distinguished from economic loss, such as lost profits. Gibraltar Casualty Co. v. Sargent and Lundy, 574 N.E.2d 664, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); CMO Graphics Inc. v. CNA Ins. Co., 450 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)(a claim for “loss of use” of tangible property does not extend to economic losses based on lost financial interest). See e.g. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., v. Wilkin Insulation Co. 555 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)(finding damage to school buildings laden with asbestos, which would be considered unsafe until abatement procedures were completed, fell into “loss of use” prong of property damage definition); Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Chester-Jensen Co., 611 N.E.2d 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that there was no property damage when a claimant alleged loss or diminished use simply resulting from the failure of a component to perform).

Trigger of Coverage for Latent Injury i.e. exposure to asbestos, silica and lead paint

       

Illinois courts have recognized that “bodily injury” and “property damage” are two distinct concepts which may require different characterizations of their respective coverage triggers. See John Crane, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 991 N.E.2d 474, 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 1253 (Ill.1994). Accordingly, Illinois has adopted the “triple trigger” approach in determining coverage disputes for latent bodily injury claims; while it has adopted the “continuous trigger” approach for latent property damage claims. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 150 (Ill.1987) (bodily injury); U.S. Gypsum Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226 (property damage).

Continuous trigger

       

The Illinois Supreme Court in Zurich, supra, addressed the continuous trigger theory as it relates to asbestos-related personal injury claims. 514 N.E.2d 150. It found that, according to the expert testimony on record, there is no evidence that a claimant suffers continuous injury from the time of initial exposure to sickness or disease. Id. at 160–161. Rather, the expert testimony revealed “that asbestos-related disease may or may not progress during periods of nonexposure” and “there are cases in which the disease progresses during periods of nonexposure and cases in which there is no progression.” Id. Thus, the court found no continuing bodily injury from the time “exposure to asbestos ends and the time an asbestos-related disease becomes diagnosable,” and rejected the continuous trigger theory. Id.

Injury-in-fact trigger

       

Under the “injury-in-fact” coverage trigger, the policy period triggered is the one that was in effect when the damage is shown to have in fact occurred, irrespective of when the exposure occurred or when the damage was discovered. American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984). Illinois courts have not adopted this approach for latent injury claims.

Triple Trigger

Illinois courts have found that asbestos-related bodily injuries have three separate and discrete periods—bodily injury, sickness and disease—and that “each of these events triggers coverage.” John Crane, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 991 N.E.2d 474, 492 (Ill App. Ct. 2013) (quoting Zurich, 514 N.E.2d at 159).

In Zurich, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed trigger and allocation of coverage for asbestos bodily injury claims in the context of a dispute between an insured and the insured’s primary liability carriers. The court adopted a “triple trigger” theory holding that insurance policies in effect during the years of exposure, during the years of sickness, and during the year of manifestation of disease are triggered.

Trigger of Coverage for Non-Latent Injury

General

The timing of an injury is the essential factor in determining which policy coverage is triggered. See Pekin Ins. Co. v. Janes & Addems Chevrolet, Inc. 636 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) International Environmental Corp. v. National Union Ins. Co. 860 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill. 1994); see also, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 260 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2001) (although cement pilings were driven months earlier, no coverage was triggered until tunnel collapsed, causing flooding. Policies preceding tunnel collapse were not triggered).

Construction Defect Claims

Under Illinois law, property damage occurs when a defective product causes damages. It does not necessarily occur when a defective product is installed. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. United Plastics Grp., Inc., 512 F.3d 953, 961 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Traveler’s Ins. Co. v. Eljer Mfg., Inc., 757 N.E.2d 481 (Ill.2001). In Eljer, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the term “physical injury.” In that case, the policies defined property damage as “physical injury to . . . tangible property which occurs during the policy period.” The court held that the policies in effect at the time of installation of the plumbing system were not triggered if no leak occurred during the policy period. The court also held that damage caused by replacing functioning systems in anticipation of a leak was not covered.

Duty to Defend Covered and Uncovered Claims

       

The general rule in Illinois is that an insurer has a duty to defend a multicount complaint if at least one of the claims potentially falls within the coverage of the policy. See Pekin Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 930 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ill. 2010); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ill. 1976); Empire Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Chicago Province of the Society of Jesus, 990 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).

Duty to defend contractual indemnity and common law indemnity claims

General contractor against insured

       

Generally, the coverage of a liability insurance policy extends to an insured’s agreement to indemnify, notwithstanding an exclusion for an insured’s “assumption of liability in a contract or agreement,” if the policy contains the common “insured contract” exception—a contract or agreement pertaining to your business under which you assume the tort liability of another. An “insured contract” is one in which one of the contracting parties agrees to indemnify the other from and against that other party’s own negligence. Virginia Sur. Co. v. Northern Ins. Co., 866 N.E.2d 149, 152, 158–59 (Ill. 2007). If the indemnification provision fails to clearly express an intention to indemnify for the negligence of the indemnitee, however, it generally is unenforceable, and there is no assumption of tort liability and no insured contract. See, e.g., Hankins v. Pekin Ins. Co., 713 N.E.2d 1244, 1248–49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).

Is there an anti-indemnification statute?

       

Yes, the Construction Contract Indemnification for Negligence Act, 740 ILCS 35/0/01, et seq. (the “Act”), prohibits contract language that indemnifies a party for that party’s own negligence. Prior to enactment of the Act in 1971, it was generally held that an indemnity contract would not be construed as indemnifying one against his own negligence, unless such a construction was required by clear and explicit language in the contract or such intention was expressed in unequivocal terms. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Elevator Co. v. La Salle Monroe Bldg. Corp., 70 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ill. 1946). However, such agreements were declared by the legislature to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable with passage of the Act, at least in the context of construction contracts (and with respect to indemnification as opposed to contribution).

Insurer’s Wrongful Refusal to Defend

Reliance on coverage defenses to deny indemnity

       

Where a complaint alleges facts potentially within the policy’s coverage, an insurer taking the position that a claim is not covered cannot simply refuse to defend the suit. Rather, the insurer must either defend the suit under a reservation of rights, or seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage. If the insurer fails to take either of these actions, the estoppel doctrine applies. The estoppel doctrine has broad application and operates to bar the insurer from raising policy defenses to coverage, even those defenses that may have been successful had the insurer not breached its duty to defend. Employers Ins. v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1135–36 (Ill. 1999); see also, e.g., Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 19 N.E.3d 106, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).

       

Conditions of Coverage

Late notice

Factors considered to determine if coverage is forfeited

The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that insurance policy notice provisions impose valid prerequisites to coverage. A policy condition requiring notice “as soon as practicable” is interpreted to mean “within a reasonable time.” Whether notice has been given within a reasonable time depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Breaching a policy’s notice clause by failing to give reasonable notice will defeat the right of the insured party to recover under the policy. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 338, 343 (Ill. 2006).

       

In determining whether the insurer received reasonable notice, Illinois courts have considered the following factors: the specific language of the policy’s notice provision; the insured’s sophistication in commerce and insurance matters; the insured’s awareness of an event which may trigger insurance coverage; and the insured’s diligence in ascertaining whether policy coverage is available. Livorsi, 856 N.E.2d at 344. Further, the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer is one factor to consider when determining whether a policyholder has fulfilled any policy condition requiring reasonable notice. Id. at 346.

Prejudice requirement

       

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that an insurer is not required to show that it was prejudiced by the failure of the insured to provide timely notice, before the insurer may rely on late notice as a defense to coverage. Livorsi, 856 N.E.2d at 346. As stated above, the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer is one factor to consider when determining whether a policyholder has fulfilled any policy condition requiring reasonable notice. Further, the Livorsi Court also held that “once it is determined that the insurer did not receive reasonable notice of an occurrence or a lawsuit, the policyholder may not recover under the policy, regardless of whether the lack of reasonable notice prejudiced the insurer.” Id.

Meaning of “arising out of”

Coverage grants/agreements

       

The meaning of “arising out of” is broad and vague and should be liberally construed. Courts generally interpret “arising out of” in this manner when it appears in a section of the policy providing coverage. In these circumstances, a broad interpretation inures to the benefit of the insured by expanding coverage. See, e.g., Oakley Transp. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 648 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).

Exclusions

       

In contrast to the broad meaning given to “arising out of” in the context of a coverage grant, a broad interpretation of “arising out of” in an exclusion would expand the exclusion to the advantage of the insurer. This would turn on its head established judicial precedent regarding liberal construction of insurance policies in favor of the insured. Oakley, 648 N.E.2d at 1104; see also, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Dare, 830 N.E.2d 670, 682 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).

Other policy forms

See, e.g., infra Part 6.2.

Coverage for punitive damages

Insurable?

Illinois public policy prohibits insurance against liability for punitive damages that arise out of the misconduct of the insured. Crawford Labs. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 653, 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); see also, e.g., Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (agreeing that allowing the wrongdoer to shift the burden would serve no useful purpose, as both the insurance company which did no wrong, and the public in the form of premium payers, would be punished for the wrong committed by the insured.

Vicariously assessed punitive damages, however, are insurable in Illinois. Beaver, 420 N.E.2d at 1061 (stating that that an employer may insure himself against vicarious liability for punitive damages assessed against him in consequence of the wrongful conduct of his employee) (citing Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 245 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)).

Distinction for statutory multiple damages?

       

Yes, under certain circumstances. For instance, in Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lay, 989 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. 2013), the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether statutory damages claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”) could be covered by a commercial general liability insurance policy. In finding coverage, the court emphasized that the statutory damages could be viewed both as compensation for the annoyance and inconvenience of receiving unsolicited faxes and loss of paper and ink, as well as providing an incentive for aggrieved parties to enforce the statute. The court explained, “The TCPA is ‘clearly within the class of remedial statutes which are designed to grant remedies for the protection of rights, introduce regulation conducive to the public good, or cure public evils.’” Id. at 599 (quoting Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, Int’l, 430 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. 1981)). Accordingly, the Lay court held that the TCPA is a remedial and not a punitive statute.

Additional Insured Endorsement

Contract or writing required

An oral agreement or promise to procure additional insured coverage, by itself, is insufficient to provide coverage, when an additional insured endorsement requires “a written contract with the Named Insured”. The same is true even when the oral agreement is reduced to writing, after the loss has occurred. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Gateway Constr. Co., 865 N.E.2d 395, 399–400 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (stating that could lead to collusion by the interested parties to create coverage by manufacturing an oral promise after the injury occurs). However, even where there is no written agreement required by an endorsement, courts have conferred additional insured status, when there is other evidence establishing a timely contractual commitment; such evidence includes a certificate of insurance, a letter from the insurer, and several internal memoranda from the insurer confirming additional insured status. West American Ins. Co. v. J.R. Constr. Co., 777 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).

Analysis and factors considered for liability arising out of/caused by the named insured’s work

       

In defining the scope of coverage extended by additional insured endorsements, Illinois courts consider the meaning of “arising out of,” which is both broad and vague, and must be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Illinois courts construe such language broadly as establishing “but for,” rather than proximate, causation. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 439, 440, 442–43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (covering general contractor additional insured for “liability arising out of” named insured’s work for additional insured); American States Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 683 N.E.2d 510, 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding there would not have been any injury “but for” work performed on a job site, and that liability of general contractor additional insured arose out of work of subcontractor named insured’ ); Casualty Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 501 N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (covering additional insured for “liability ‘arising out of operations’ performed for” additional insured by named insured).

Courts have required only a minimal connection between the additional insured’s alleged liability and the additional insured’s presence on the job. See, e.g., Casualty Ins. Co., 501 N.E.2d at 816 (potential existed that liability arose out of acts or omissions in connection with general supervision of operations, based on alleged right to control and coordinate work).

Coverage B- Personal and Advertising Injury

Meaning of publication for “oral or written publication of material, in any manner, that violates a person’s right of privacy” offense

       

In Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Swiderski Elecs., Inc., 860 N.E.2d 307, 316–17 (Ill. 2006), the Illinois Supreme Court considered the following dictionary definitions of “publication”: “communication (as of news or information) to the public”; “the act or process of issuing copies”; “[g]enerally, the act of declaring or announcing to the public”; and “[t]he offering or distribution of copies of a work to the public.” By faxing advertisements to the proposed class of fax recipients as alleged in the named class member’s complaint, the Swiderski Court concluded that fax advertisements were published both in the general sense of communicating information to the public and in the sense of distributing copies of the advertisements to the public.

       

In Swiderski, the Illinois Supreme Court also defined “privacy” to include both rights of secrecy and seclusion. 860 N.E.2d at 317–20.